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39 
The Fate of Universalism in Global Insolvency: 





Recent cases in the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia have 
all signaled that international insolvency law is slowly losing traction to 
more regional proceedings.  This can have huge ramifications for creditors 
of international companies.  The past decade has seen much international 
progress in business insolvencies; with the previous “territorialist” models 
of regional dismantling giving way to more “universalist” approaches.  New 
trends in these large jurisdictions may herald the discovery of modified 
universalism’s breaking point, but not its diminishment nor defeat.  This 
healthy prognosis for modified universalism in the U.S., United Kingdom 
(U.K.), and Australia is further bolstered by a proliferation of new and 
exciting universalist tendencies in jurisdictions around the world. 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
It has been written that “no aspect of human endeavor is more clearly 
global than commerce and investment and no part of commercial law has 
been more in the forefront of international cooperation than the law of 
insolvency.”1  Corporate bankruptcy (also sometimes called corporate 
“insolvency”) 2 is a method by which debtor companies can keep creditors 
from enforcing some or all of their claims during a period of reorganization 
or liquidation.3  Creditors also benefit from a more ordered enforcement of 
 
 1. Jay Lawrence Westbrook,Interpretation Internationale, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 739, 740 
(2015) [hereinafter Interpretation Internationale]. 
 2. See, e.g., Sandeep Gopalan & Michael Guihot, Recognition and Enforcement in 
Cross-Border Insolvency Law: A Proposal for Judicial Gap-Filling, 48 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 1225, 1235 (2015); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Comity and Choice of Law in Global 
Insolvencies, 54 TEX. INT’L L.J. 259, 260 (2019) [hereinafter Comity and Choice of Law].  But 
cf., Soheyla Kefayati & Mehdi Ashouri, International Bankruptcy with an Emphasis on Trade 
Bill Approved in 2013, 10 J. POL. & L. 1, 2 (2017) (stating the Iranian bankruptcy regime is 
for businessmen and corporations while the insolvency regime is for all others). 
 3. See, e.g., Bankruptcy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).  
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claims, which staves off “a creditor race”4 that could leave an unwary lender 
empty-handed.  When an ailing company must file for bankruptcy in more 
than one court system, it is known as a “cross-border insolvency.”5  Despite 
the term’s suggestion, planetary stays of creditor collection are not yet 
available6 and “there is no super-national bankruptcy law.”7 
Instead of such a global system, corporate bankruptcy law is usually 
thought of as two competing schools of thought: territorialism and 
universalism.8  These two schools coalesce into a third, known as modified 
universalism.9  Though these three terms have applications outside of 
bankruptcy law, this Comment will use them exclusively in their bankruptcy 
context.  Territorialism, universalism, and modified universalism will be 
discussed below in Part I. 
In 1997, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) released its Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (Model 
Law).10  As of the time of this publishing, the Model Law has been adopted 
by forty-seven countries on six continents.11  The related UNCITRAL Model 
Law on Recognition and Enforcement of Insolvency-Related Judgments 
(Model Enforcement Law) was subsequently released in 201812 and is 
designed to “provide [s]tates with a simple, straightforward and harmonized 
procedure for recognition and enforcement of insolvency-related 
 
 4. Andrew B. Dawson, The Problem of Local Methods in Cross-Border Insolvencies, 
12 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 45, 50 (2015). 
 5. E.g., Xenia Kler, COMI Comity: International Standardization of COMI Factors 
Needed to Avoid Inconsistent Application Within Cross-Border Insolvency Cases, 34 AM. U. 
INT’L L. REV. 429, 431 (2018). 
 6. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Global Insolvency Proceedings for a Global Market: 
The Universalist System and the Choice of a Central Court, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1473, 1479 
(2018) [hereinafter Global Insolvency Proceedings]. 
 7. Dawson, supra note 4, at 50. 
 8. See, e.g., Jonathan C. Gordon, Crossing the Line in Cross-Border Insolvencies, 27 
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 17, 21 (2019). 
 9. See, e.g., Lia Metreveli, Toward Standardized Enforcement of Cross-Border 
Insolvency Decisions: Encouraging the United States to Adopt UNCITRAL’s Recent 
Amendment to Its Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, 51 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 
315, 316 (2017); Dawson, supra note 4, at 53. 
 10. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (May 
30, 1997), https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/insolvency/modellaw/cross-border_insolvency (last 
visited Dec. 15, 2019). 
 11. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Overview of the Status of UNCITRAL 
Conventions and Model Laws (Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/ 
TAC/Status/Overview-Status-Table.pdf (last visited Dec. 15, 2019). 
 12. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, UNCITRAL Model Law on Recognition and 
Enforcement of Insolvency-Related Judgments (July 2, 2018), https://uncitral.un.org/ 
en/texts/insolvency/modellaw/mlij (last visited Dec. 15, 2019). 
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judgments.”13  An effort similar to that of UNCITRAL has been undertaken 
by the Judicial Insolvency Network (JIN).  JIN has promulgated the 
Guidelines for Communication and Cooperation Between Courts in Cross-
Border Insolvency Matters (Guidelines).14  The Guidelines address issues 
regarding inter-judicial communication,15 and have gained at least unofficial 
acceptance in parts of the United States (U.S.), Singapore, Canada, and 
more.16  The Model Law, Model Enforcement Law, and JIN Guidelines will 
be discussed below in Part II. 
Even with broad acceptance of the Model Law,17 as well as the release 
of the yet-to-be-tested Model Enforcement Law18 and JIN Guidelines,19 
some scholarly literature has recently argued that universalism no longer 
seems to be on a trajectory towards global acceptance. 20  In the last decade, 
court decisions in the U.S., U.K., and Australia have been cited as examples 
of the respective court systems casting off a previous universalist tendency 
and instead exhibiting characteristics that are distinctly territorialist; 
including such actions as denying recognition of foreign main proceedings, 
refusing to enforce judgments from foreign bankruptcy courts, refusing to 
apply the foreign main proceeding’s substantive law, and other such judicial 
determinations that generally prefer treatment of local creditors over foreign 
ones.  These cases and arguments will be summarized below in Part III. 
In stating universalism as having suffered a major setback, the 
pessimistic literature too hastily discounts the numerous other proceedings 
around the world that validate many modified universalist victories.  These 
victories are in large jurisdictions, such as Singapore, India, and Iran, as well 
 
 13. Id. 
 14. Judicial Insolvency Network, Guidelines for Communication and Cooperation 
Between Courts in Cross-Border Insolvency Matters (Oct. 11, 2016) http://www.jin-
global.org/jin-guidelines.html [hereinafter JIN Guidelines] (last visited Dec. 15, 2019). 
 15. See generally, Paul H. Zumbro & Omid H. Nasab, Two Is Company, but Three Is a 
(Better) Crowd: The Southern District of New York Joins Delaware and Singapore in 
Adopting Cross-Border Insolvency Guidelines, 11 INSOLVENCY & RESTRUCTURING INT’L 21 
(2017). 
 16. JIN Guidelines, supra note 14. 
 17. See, e.g., John A. E. Pottow, The Dialogic Aspect of Soft Law in International 
Insolvency: Discord, Digression, and Development, 40 MICH. J. INT’L L. 479, 484 (2019) 
(“Moreover, the adoption rate of the [Model Law] rate of adoption has been . . . relatively 
impressive in terms of its breadth.”). 
 18. See Varoon Sachdev, Choice of Law in Insolvency Proceedings: How English 
Courts’ Continued Reliance on the Gibbs Principle Threatens Universalism, 93 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 343, 349 (2019). 
 19. E.g., JIN Guidelines, supra note 14. 
 20. See Adrian Walters, Modified Universalisms & the Role of Local Legal Culture in 
the Making of Cross-Border Insolvency Law, 93 AM. BANKR. L.J. 47, 78 (2019) (“The 
divergence between the [U.S. and U.K.] systems . . . present[s] challenges for universalism’s 
harmonization agenda.”). 
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as some smaller countries also herein addressed.  The victories reflect large 
systemic shifts in each mentioned jurisdiction.  These shifts toward 
universalism are discussed below in Part IV.  
Part V is a brief survey of continued territorialism in certain 
jurisdictions.  Though not explored in-depth in this Comment, this author 
notes it can also be argued that a lack of positive universalist strides is itself 
a victory for the otherwise natural state of territorialism. 
This Comment argues that the recent global universalist victories vastly 
overshadow the slight setbacks the theory’s application has experienced in 
U.S., U.K., and Australian law that are arguably territorialist and reflect 
conservative lack of international comity.  Taken as a whole, this Comment 
stands for the proposition that the world is moving ever closer to a unified 
playing field for international corporate creditors and debtors alike. 
 
II.  Territorialism, Universalism, and Modified Universalism 
 
The argument between territorialism and universalism has been 
described as “a long-standing scholarly debate”21 between what is essentially 
“two broad extreme dichotomies.”22  Both of these two extremes find 
temperance in a middle ground known as modified universalism.  The 
current opinion in legal scholarly writing is that “[m]odified universalism 
still seems to be where ‘it’s at’ . . . .”23  This statement has been refuted by 
those that point to recent decisions in the U.S. that could “render global 
management of a global insolvency nearly impossible,”24 and decisions in 
the U.K. that essentially require those “seeking to alter an English law 
contract” to do so by going to jolly old England themselves.25   
Some authors have argued that judicial actions that satisfy local 
interests should be classified “crudely as ‘territorialist’”26 and the opposite 
actions as universalist.  This thinking has its drawbacks.  It can even give 
professional discussions a moral tinge in regular practice.27  This can be 
somewhat appropriate, however, because the choice of insolvency system a 
government elects has drastic impacts for debtors and for creditors to entities 
that operate in that country which may potentially become insolvent in the 
 
 21. Fabio Weinberg Crocco, When Deference Makes a Difference: The Role of U.S. 
Courts in Cross-Border Bankruptcies, 28 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. (2019).  
 22. Gerard McCormack & Wan Wai Yee, The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency Comes of Age: New Times or New Paradigms?, 54 TEX. INT’L L.J. 273, 276 (2019). 
 23. Ian G. Williams & Adrian J. Walters, Modified Universalism in Our Time? A Look 
at Two Recent Cases in the U.S. and U.K., 37 AM. BANKR. INST. J., 24, 52 (2018). 
 24. Comity and Choice of Law, supra note 2, at 262. 
 25. Comity and Choice of Law, supra note 2, at 270. 
 26. Walters, supra note 20, at 71. 
 27. Id. 
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future.  To better understand these issues, it will be helpful to understand the 
concepts of territorialism, universalism, and modified universalism. 
 
A.  Territorialism 
 
Territorialism is sometimes known as the “grab rule”28 and is a 
bankruptcy scheme in which each jurisdiction requires its own bankruptcy 
proceeding over the entirety of the assets that the debtor has located in that 
jurisdiction.29  The necessity of many different proceedings leads to many 
inefficiencies in the process.30 
Some of the main problems that present themselves in a territorialist 
regime are: increased costs, “disparate treatment of similar creditors,” and a 
high level of necessary creditor cooperation.31  Because of these difficulties, 
creditors without a local presence can have a more difficult task collecting 
in a jurisdiction remote to them. 
These disadvantages are moderately offset by the advantages of 
simplicity, predictability, clarity, and avoidance.32  It must be noted that these 
advantages of territorialism are only true when viewed through the eyes of 
the local creditor.33  Recent literature suggests that maintaining a territorialist 
attitude may also benefit local bankruptcy practitioners.34  
 
B.  Universalism 
 
Universalism can be thought of as a system in which bankruptcies 
involve “unified global proceedings, administered by one principal court 
under a single governing law, but potentially with the assistance of courts in 
other jurisdictions.  Assets located in ‘secondary jurisdictions’ are either 
transferred to the main one or simply subject to the same bankruptcy regime 
. . . .”35  The area in which the main bankruptcy proceeding takes place in 
universalism is often referred to as the entity’s center of main interests 
 
 28. E.g., Gopalan et al., supra note 2, at 1267; Comity and Choice of Law, supra note 2, 
at 263. 
 29. See, e.g., Crocco, supra note 21; Dawson, supra note 4, at 52; Metreveli, supra note 
9, at 320. 
 30. See Gopalan et al., supra note 2, at 1228. 
 31. Metreveli, supra note 9, at 320-21. 
 32. See Metreveli, supra note 9, at 320. 
 33. See Metreveli, supra note 9, at 316. 
 34. See Williams et al., supra note 23, at 25 (“Maintaining the territorialist proposition 
. . . could turn out to be an important focus for professionals on both sides of the pond.”). 
 35. Crocco, supra note 21 (footnotes omitted).  
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(COMI).36  In pure universalism, the COMI court would be in charge of the 
entirety of the bankruptcy on a “worldwide basis.”37 
One of the big criticisms of universalism is there is no way for it to be 
instituted without either “a comprehensive insolvency convention or global 
courts and centralized enforcement mechanisms.”38  This leads some to 
conclude that universalism “is detached from reality”39 and that a global legal 
regime replacing a nation’s own may be too big an issue for some countries.40  
Also, COMI disputes can arguably lead to forum shopping among the 
different jurisdictions by a company moving its assets in anticipation of 
filing soon after in the relocation jurisdiction.41 
Despite these criticisms, “[m]ovement towards the internationalization 
of private international law has been apparent from some time . . .”42 and 
“[t]he majority of scholars agree that, at least in theory, universalism is the 
most efficient approach to dealing with international insolvencies.”43  
The advantages of universalism include eliminating costs by only 
having one set of proceedings, minimizing “disparate treatment of creditors” 
from inside and outside the COMI jurisdiction, facilitating information 
sharing, and helping enable reorganizations.44  While any actual practicing 
form of pure universalism is not yet apparent, proponents have yet to be 
proven wrong in their assertion that “[o]nly in a single proceeding can all 
assets be assembled to be sold or recapitalized free of prior claims and value 
allocated fairly to all stakeholders.”45  
 
C.  Modified Universalism 
 
Modified universalism is a combination of both territorialism and 
universalism,46 that involves a main proceeding in the entity’s COMI as well 
as each participating nation’s ability to determine whether or not to “defer to 
the law applicable in the main proceeding” in certain instances.47  This added 
 
 36. See, e.g., Gopalan et al., supra note 2, at 1267; Metreveli, supra note 9, at 321. 
 37. TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY: COOPERATION AMONG THE NAFTA COUNTRIES, 
PRINCIPLES OF COOPERATION AMONG THE NAFTA COUNTRIES § II.A (AM. LAW INST. 2003).  
 38. Walters, supra note 20, at 49. 
 39. Dawson, supra note 4, at 51. 
 40. See Gopalan et al., supra note 2, at 1269; Metreveli, supra note 9, at 321. 
 41. See Metreveli, supra note 9, at 321. 
 42. Irit Mevorach, Modified Universalism as Customary International Law, 96 TEX. L. 
REV. 1403, 1421 (2018). 
 43. Crocco, supra note 21.   
 44. Metreveli, supra note 9, at 321. 
 45. Global Insolvency Proceedings, supra note 6, at 1476. 
 46. See, e.g., Metreveli, supra note 9, at 316. 
 47. Walters, supra note 20, at 63; accord Dawson, supra note 4, at 53. 
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“flexibility”48 comes with the caveat that it is still possible for “the laws of 
the jurisdiction where the main proceeding is taking place [to] produce 
extraterritorial effects . . . .”49  
Modified universalism’s current manifestation also utilizes agents 
known as foreign representatives to represent the main bankruptcy 
proceeding at ancillary ones.50  These representatives use the ancillary court 
for requests relating to discovery and injunctions,51 actions to stop (or 
“avoid”) the collection of secured assets,52 and more. 
Criticisms of modified universalism include the idea that modernized 
states benefit from it more than burgeoning states do,53 in that it might 
(among other things) frustrate local creditors’ expectations.  This is possible, 
in part, due to the nonexistence of any international common law 
jurisprudence regarding modified universalism, or natural modes to enforce 
international insolvency. 54  It is likely that local and foreign creditor’s 
expectations would be more likely to be aligned if an international common 
law regarding cross-border insolvency were to be acknowledged in the 
future.  
Another criticism of modified universalism is that it assumes that it is 
the job of countries to reduce transactional friction, when this might not be 
the overall ethos of the people of that state.55  As stated above, states each 
make careful and unique calculations about how they want to balance 
creditor rights with debtor ones.56  It is not given that an international 
insolvency regime is something a state is prepared for, or wants. 
If true universalism is a process of moving away from the natural 
inclination towards territorialism, it seems that most jurisdictions in our 
global world find themselves currently operating in the middle ground of 
modified universalism.  That said, “the status of modified universalism is 




 48. Gopalan et al., supra note 1, at 1231. 
 49. Crocco, supra note 21. 
 50. See, e.g., Metreveli, supra note 9, at 323. 
 51. See id. 
 52. See, e.g., Gopalan et al., supra note 2, at 1264 (“Eurofinance . . . were “hit with 
‘adversary proceedings’ in order to avoid and recover payments made to them.”); Lien 
Avoidance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 53. See Dawson, supra note 4, at 58; Walters, supra note 20, at 61-62. 
 54. See Mevorach, supra note 42, at 1416. 
 55. See Walters, supra note 20, at 61. 
 56. See, e.g., Jessica Nowak, The Power Struggle: Shareholder Rights in Brazilian 
Corporate Bankruptcy, 25 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 339, 348 (2018). 
 57. Mevorach, supra note 42, at 1404-05. 
2 - Sokol HICLR 44-1 (Do Not Delete) 12/7/2020  8:39 AM 
46 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 44:1 
III.  Model Law, Model Enforcement Law, and JIN Guidelines 
 
Three of the current systems trying to make order out of this amorphism 
are the Model Law, Model Enforcement Law, and the JIN Guidelines.  While 
this paper does not cover the intricacies of these three rule sets, a basic 
understanding of them will help underscore their application in modern 
modified and pure universalism theory. 
 
A.  Model Law 
 
The Model Law is widely agreed to be an instrument of modified 
universalism.58  The Model Law includes provisions intended to provide 
“[a]ccess, [r]ecognition, [r]elief, and [sic] [c]ooperation and 
[c]oordination.”59  These cross-border “soft law[s]”60 are the mechanism by 
which foreign representatives can get a foreign main proceeding recognized, 
obtain domestic stays on collections, and possibly obtain “discretionary 
relief for both main and non-main proceedings post-recognition.”61 
It has been written that “the Model Law facilitates the optimal 
management of cross-border insolvency so as to benefit debtors, creditors, 
and other stakeholders, as well as the economies in which these stakeholders 
function.”62  The wide adoption of the rules is evidence that this is true.  
The Model Law also has received criticisms, including that it does not 
provide enough “predictability for creditors or debtors in relation to the 
enforcement of insolvency judgments . . .”,63 it does not properly stress the 
creditors’ expectations as a criteria for COMI determination,64 that the COMI 
factors are “neither comprehensive nor uniform across U.S. and European 
Courts[,]”65 that the differences in timing used to determine an entity’s 
COMI can lead to forum shopping,66 and the Model Law soft law approach’s 
slow speed allows for “uncertainty derived from inconsistent application and 
 
 58. See, e.g., Walters, supra note 20, at 64; McCormack et al., supra note 22, at 276; 
Dawson, supra note 4, at 53; Gopalan et al., supra note 2, at 1231. 
 59. Metreveli, supra note 9, at 325; accord McCormack et al., supra note 22, at 276; 
Walters, supra note 20, at 57-58. 
 60. McCormack et al., supra note 22, at 304; accord Walters, supra note 20, at 65.  See 
generally, Pottow, supra note 17. 
 61. Metreveli, supra note 9, at 325. 
 62. McCormack et al., supra note 22, at 275. 
 63. Gopalan et al., supra note 2, at 1266. 
 64. See Kler, supra note 5, at 434-35. 
 65. See Kler, supra note 5, at 447. 
 66. See Metreveli, supra note 9, at 321; Kler, supra note 5, at 440.  But see Crocco, supra 
note 21 (“[E]vidence . . . supports the claim that . . . forum shopping . . . is of limited practical 
importance.”). 
2 - Sokol HICLR 44-1 (Do Not Delete) 12/7/2020  8:39 AM 
2021] Fate of Universalism in Global Insolvency 47 
interpretation . . .” in the meantime.67  While not herein discussed, it is 
noteworthy that the European Union’s Insolvency Regulation (EIR)68 for 
internal cross-border cases is very similar to the Model Law, except it 
addresses the issue of a company’s COMI using creditor’s reasonable 
expectations by taking into account where business activity occurs instead 
of just where the entity is incorporated.69  
 
B.  Model Enforcement 
 
One of the main problems with the Model Law has been addressed in 
the Model Enforcement Law.  “[T]he Model Law does not specifically deal 
with the enforcement of judgments,”70 and “UNCITRAL has recently 
attempted to respond to this inconsistency by promulgating the [Model 
Enforcement Law].”71  The Model Enforcement Law is still very new, but 
one article published while it was still just an amendment has argued it could 
introduce “more stability into the world of international insolvency by 
narrowing the range of judicial discretion and enumerating finite exceptions 
through which enforcement and recognition can be denied.”72 
Two of the main additions in the Model Enforcement Rules are in 
Article X and Article 14.  “Article X provides a mechanism to overturn 
narrow interpretations of the Model Law by stating that the discretionary 
relief available . . . ‘should be interpreted as including the recognition and 
enforcement of a judgment, notwithstanding any interpretation to the 
contrary.’”73  Article 14 offers a list of conditions “where a court may deny 
recognition in Article 14, but the accompanying Draft Guide to Enactment 
of the Model [Enforcement] Law . . . emphasizes that courts” may still honor 






 67. Gopalan et al., supra note 2, at 1230. 
 68. See, e.g., European Commission, Insolvency proceedings, https://ec.europa.eu/info/ 
policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/civil-justice/civil-and-commercial-law/insolvency-
proceedings_en (last visited Dec. 15, 2019). 
 69. See Kler, supra note 5, at 434-35. 
 70. Gopalan et al., supra note 2, at 1233. 
 71. Sachdev, supra note 18, at 349. 
 72. Metreveli, supra note 9, at 345. 
 73. Sachdev, supra note 18, at 372 (quoting MODEL LAW ON RECOGNITION AND 
ENFORCEMENT OF INSOLVENCY-RELATED JUDGMENTS ART. X (U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade 
Law 2018)). 
 74. Sachdev, supra note 18, at 372. 
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C.  JIN 
 
Among other things, JIN facilitates “the establishment of personal 
relationships among commercial judges from different countries.”75  The JIN 
Guidelines do not directly compete with the UNCITRAL laws, but instead 
“provide for the incorporation of protocols into court orders when there are 
parallel proceedings affecting a debtor company or group.”76  The Guidelines 
offer “the possibility of innovative practices such as joint hearings”77 and 
their “drafters were focused primarily on the ability of the parties to be 
present during any communication between courts on substantive matters 
. . . .”78  The Guidelines separate communication between courts that 
requires the presence of parties from that which was more procedural79 and 
their accompanying documentation gives suggestions about recording and 
preserving hearings.80 
In February 2017, the Guidelines were implemented by Singapore,81 
were instituted as local rules in Delaware, and were also adopted in the 
Southern District of New York.82  Further, “[t]he Chancery Division of the 
High Court of England [and] Wales adopted the Guidelines on [May 5,] 
2017.”83  At a recent roundtable it was also stated that, in Ontario, “there was 
a notice sent out to the insolvency community saying the court is expecting 
to see these new [JIN G]uidelines used.”84  
 
IV.  Universalism’s Mixed Success in Key JXs 
 
Even with the aforementioned three cross-border insolvency resources, 
much “has been inconsistent and unpredictable” about cross-border 
 
 75. Global Insolvency Proceedings, supra note 6, at 1492-93. 
 76. Walters, supra note 20, at 109. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Zumbro et al., supra note 15, at 22. 
 79. See id. 
 80. Zumbro et al., supra note 15, at 22-23. 
 81. Press Release, Supreme Court of Singapore, Paving the Way for Improved 
Coordination of Cross-Border Insolvency Proceedings: Adoption of the Guidelines for 
Communication and Cooperation between Courts in Cross-Border Insolvency Matters (Feb. 
1 2017) (on file with author). 
 82. See Zumbro et al., supra note 15, at 21. 
 83. Press Release, Supreme Court of Singapore, England and Wales—The latest to adopt 
the Guidelines for Communication and Cooperation between Courts in Cross-Border 
Insolvency Matters (May 11, 2017) (on file with author). 
 84. Ameneh Bordi, Scott Cousins, Andrea Hartley, Natalie Levine & James R. Risener 
III, Corporate Bankruptcy Panel Chapter 15 Choice of Law: How Far Do I Need to Go to 
Get My Money Back?, 35 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 345, 360 (2019). 
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insolvency enforcement; even in states that have adopted the Model Law.85  
It was recently stated:  
[A] judge in New York must assume that a Chapter 11 confirmed at 
Battery Park will fail to discharge any English-law contract obligations in 
England, while a judge on Fetter Lane in London would logically expect a 
substantial risk of the same in the United States as to a contract governed by 
New York law.86  
One possible general reason for these issues arising is that countries can 
have very different “broad political outlook[s]” than one another.87  For this 
reason, it is necessary to look to specific examples from key Model Law 
states to better understand the current state of affairs. 
 
A.  United States 
 
It has been said that “[t]he liberal fresh start for individuals in U.S. 
bankruptcy law is ‘peculiarly American.’”88  Further, “[t]he United States 
courts developed a strong cooperative jurisprudence through the quarter 
century or so before [adopting] the Model Law.”89  The Model Law’s 
American manifestation was codified in 2005 as Chapter 15 of the 
Bankruptcy Code.90  Currently, Chapter 15 is “the governing statutory 
scheme for U.S. cases ancillary to foreign [main] proceedings”91 and is 
today’s “sole gateway for a U[.]S[.] court to provide assistance to a foreign 
court; there is no residual common law discretion.”92  Also, “[t]he judicial 
code [of the U.S.] limits the bankruptcy judge’s authority to enter final 
judgments” to certain matters (known as “core” matters), unless both the 
parties grant their consent.93 
 
 85. Metreveli, supra note 9, at 327. 
 86. Comity and Choice of Law, supra note 2, at 262. 
 87. McCormack et al., supra note 22, at 287. 
 88. Iain Ramsay, U.S. Exceptionalism, Historical Institutionalism, and the Comparative 
Study of Consumer Bankruptcy Law, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 947, 947 (2015) (quoting MONICA 
PRASAD, THE LAND OF TOO MUCH: AMERICAN ABUNDANCE AND THE PARADOX OF POVERTY 
183 (2012)). 
 89. Interpretation Internationale, supra note 1, at 741. 
 90. See, e.g., Michael J. Venditto, The “Border Wall” in Chapter 15: Does § 1506 
Prevent Foreign Law from Crossing the Border?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 2017, at 22; 
Hardy DeLaughter, Why Two Facets of Chapter 15 Rulings Hinder Cross-Border Insolvency 
Petitions in the United States, 32 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 397, 402 (2016). 
 91. Alec P. Ostrow, Has Chapter 15 Bestowed on the Bankruptcy Court a Roving 
Commission to Do Equity After a Foreign Proceeding Has Been Recognized?, 2019 NORTON 
ANN. SURV. OF BANKR. L. (2019).  
 92. McCormack et al., supra note 22, at 291. 
 93. Martin E. Beeler, Recent Developments in Bankruptcy Jurisdiction, 2018 NORTON 
ANN. SURV. OF BANKR. L. (2018). 
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The natural inclination would be to assume that the U.S. has been on a 
continuous trajectory towards more expansive universalism, but this is far 
from the case.  Recent U.S. case law suggests to many that “the U.S. courts 
have interpreted Chapter 15 in ways that are inconsistent with the workings 
and purposes of the Model Law,”94 or at least aspects of their application can 
be “a bit skewed”95 and “present old situations with new complications.”96  
Other authors have argued that these recent cases, discussed below, “do not 
deviate from the prevailing American view” that international concessions 
are to be made whenever possible97 and that denials happen only in a 
minority of cases.98 
There appears to be four main issues that have come up in the last 
decade regarding U.S. courts and Chapter 15: issues with defining 
appropriate relief, issues with deciding when and how to determine a 
company’s COMI, issues with when to utilize the public policy exception to 
recognition, and issues with the granting of non-debtor releases.  
The first issue, U.S. interpretation of the term appropriate relief, has 
been criticized as having “a lack of definitive standards . . .”99 that allows 
judges to decide whether or not the edict of a foreign court comports with 
the fairness necessary to be honored domestically.100  “Chapter 15 allots 
automatic relief through 11 U.S.C. § 1520.5.  Additionally, § 1521 grants a 
bankruptcy court discretion to provide supplementary relief that may be 
necessary to protect a debtor or its creditors.”101  The appropriate 
discretionary relief has been criticized as being “one-sided, as it can only be 
granted at the request of the foreign representative.”102  That said, current 
literature has argued that courts have recently “ruled that the authority 
granted under the ‘appropriate relief’ provision is broad and thus available 
to override domestic legal doctrines . . . .”103  This arguably implies 
discretion for a future court to grant requests made by those other than a 
foreign representative. 
 
 94. Dawson, supra note 4, at 47; accord Metreveli, supra note 9, at 336.  
 95. Alec P. Ostrow, Situation Comity: Something Familiar, Something Peculiar, Nothing 
That’s Formal, Nothing That’s Normal, 2018 NORTON ANN. SURV. OF BANKR. L. (2018). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Walters, supra note 20, at 90. 
 98. See Crocco, supra note 21 (“Empirical evidence suggests that U.S. bankruptcy courts 
are generally cooperative and, in the vast majority of cases, grant both recognition petitions 
and motions for discretionary relief.”). 
 99. Venditto, supra note 90, at 76.  
 100. See id. 
 101. DeLaughter, supra note 90, at 398 (footnote omitted). 
 102. Patricia B. Tomasco & Sara C. Clark, Heads I Win, Tails You Lose: Asymmetric 
Discovery in Chapter 15, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 2019, at 27 (emphasis omitted). 
 103. Ostrow, supra note 91 (footnote omitted). 
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The next issue, deciding when and how to determine a company’s 
COMI, has yet to be addressed in U.S. statutes.104  This is an issue because a 
determination that an order is not from a debtor’s COMI can “significantly 
limit the scope of discovery that a foreign representative can seek . . . .”105  
There have been large discrepancies in how differing jurisdictions in the U.S. 
have dealt with this lack of insight.106  However, it has recently been stated 
that “in the vast majority of cases, courts found that the foreign proceeding 
was pending in the jurisdiction where the debtor had its COMI.”107  When 
combined “with the high rate of recognitions of foreign proceedings, [this] 
supports the claim that concerns about forum shopping and manipulation of 
COMI, although relevant, is [sic] of limited practical importance.”108  
Another issue is the criteria for use of the public policy exception, 
which “authorizes the court to refuse to take action under Chapter 15 if it 
would be ‘manifestly contrary to the public policy of the United States.’”109  
In theory, “the public policy exception [should] be used narrowly and applied 
only in ‘circumstances where a “fundamental policy” of the United States is 
threatened.’”110  However, “[d]espite the seemingly compulsory language 
. . . [the] public policy exception [] seemingly permits the bankruptcy court 
to deny [] otherwise-mandated recognition.”111  One author also complained 
about a U.S. court granting recognition to a case over allegations that the 
foreign main proceeding was a “predatory corporate raid[],” which should 
have triggered the public policy exception.112  
The last large U.S. issue regards non-debtor (i.e. third-party) releases. 
Courts “in the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth and Eleventh 
Circuits” allow non-debtor releases in certain circumstances.113  “[T]he Fifth, 
Ninth, Tenth, and the District of Columbia Circuits” have stated that non-
 
 104. See Bordi et al., supra note 84, at 347. 
 105. Tomasco et al., supra note 102, at 27. 
 106. See, e.g., Kler, supra note 5, at 438; DeLaughter, supra note 90, at 412.  See generally 
Gopalan et al., supra note 2, at 1250 (reciting COMI determination factors used in another 
U.S. case). 
 107. Crocco, supra note 21. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Gopalan et al., supra note 2, at 1250 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1506). 
 110. Metreveli, supra note 9, at 336 (quoting Kevin P. Ray, Ch. 15 and Public Policy 
Lessons from Jaffe v. Samsung, LAW 360 (Mar. 21, 2014, 12:36 AM), http://www.law360.co 
m/articles/520171/ch-15-and-public-policy-lessons-from-jaffe-v-samsung; accord Ostrow, 
supra note 91.  
 111. Venditto, supra note 90, at 23; accord Metreveli, supra note 9, at 336. 
 112. See D. Farrington Yates, George V. Utlik, Daniel J. Saval & Adam M. Lavine, 
Coming to America: Alleged Predatory Corporate Raiding Makes Landfall in the United 
States through Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, 12 INSOLVENCY & RESTRUCTURING INT’L 
17, 18 (2018). 
 113. Beeler, supra note 93. 
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debtor releases are barred.114  The resulting circuit split115 has left things in a 
state of confusion that the Supreme Court has yet to address.116  
One other minor issue is the inability to remove a foreign 
representative, as it would “likely lead to dismissal” and is “a draconian 
sanction that courts have cautioned against.”117  Also, fining the foreign 
representative would be similarly punitive on a debtor who “has agreed to 
some kind of indemnification[.]”118  Ergo, any punishment is likely to be 
unfairly passed on. 
These issues have come up in a number of different U.S. cases.  In this 
author’s opinion, the relevant literature of the 2010’s U.S. can be divided in 
three main eras: the first with movement towards universalism, the next with 
a contraction towards territorialism, and the third with signs of a reversal 
towards a more universalist outlook. 
At the beginning of the decade, the literature states cases like In re 
Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investment (Metcalfe)119 seemed to herald 
signs of continued or even increased deference to foreign main 
proceedings.120  In Metcalfe, the U.S. court chose to honor a Canadian 
foreign main proceeding’s restructuring plan.  The plan resulted in different 
outcomes for U.S. creditors,121 however the court decided that the public 
policy exception in Chapter 15 was not applicable due to the use of similar 
insolvency methods.122  
The first case indicating the U.S. territorialist turn was In re Vitro S.A.B. 
de CV;123 which involved a “hotly contested plan from the one voting class 
of creditors . . . achieved through the counting of votes from ‘insiders’ (i.e., 
50 percent of all voting claims were held by intercompany debtholders) 
. . . .”124  The court decided that, at least in this instance, “non-debtor 
discharges were generally unavailable” to those in the U.S., and were not 
 
 114. In re Avanti Commc’ns. Grp. PLC, 582 B.R. 603, 606 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
 115. See, e.g., Gerald C. Bender, Giorgio Bovenzi & Oscar N. Pinkas, Scheme of 
Arrangement Confirming Nonconsensual Third-Party Releases Approved in Chapter 15s, 
AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec. 2018, at 34; Pierce G. Hand, IV, The Eleventh Circuit’s Second 
Shot at Getting It Right: Nonconsensual Nondebtor Releases in Bankruptcy Court, 15 
DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 107, 108 (2017). 
 116. Hand, supra note 115, at 108. 
 117. Gordon, supra note 8, at 38. 
 118. Gordon, supra note 8, at 39. 
 119. In re Metcalfe & Mansfield Alt. Invs., 421 B.R. 685 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2010). 
 120. See, e.g., Metreveli, supra note 9, at 336-37 (stating a New York court cited to 
principles of comity and “modified universalism” in its decision to enforce a foreign 
restructuring plan). 
 121. See Metreveli, supra note 9, at 336-37. 
 122. See Gopalan et al., supra note 2, at 1255-56. 
 123. In re Vitro S.A.B. de CV, 701 F.3d 1031 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 124. Bender et al., supra note 115, at 35. 
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“appropriate relief.”125  This is arguably an “expansive interpretation” of the 
public policy exception.126  That stated,most of the current literature argues 
that the case was an exception borne out of the impropriety of the approved 
voting plan.127 
A second case that reinforced the return of territorialism was Jaffé v. 
Samsung Electronics.128  Therein, the court “held that granting [a] German 
liquidator’s request to terminate U.S. patent licenses would slow the pace of 
innovation and undermine the U.S. economy . . .” and was therefore against 
public policy.129  The appeals court subsequently affirmed on the different 
grounds of insufficient protection for local interests.130  There is some 
argument that this was, again, an exception to the usual comity displayed by 
the U.S. at the time.131 
Two 2017 cases, In re Arcapita Bank B.S.C. (Arcapita)132 and In re 
SunEdison, Inc. (SunEdison),133 both have territorialist aspects.  In Arcapita, 
the court decided to keep funds transferred “between New York banks, [even 
though] the defendants made the placement investments at issue overseas[] 
in London or Bahrain[,]”134 and that doing so was “to the exclusion of [the 
parties’] legitimate expectations in the circumstances of an insolvency of a 
Bahraini entity with whom the relevant contracts were made under Bahraini 
law.”135  The second 2017 case, SunEdison, resulted in the court holding an 
“ipso facto clause gave the U.S. debtor the right to terminate the contract and 
reclaim [an intellectual property] grant despite the provision of Korean 
bankruptcy law that made such a clause unenforceable against the Korean 
debtor.”136  These two cases arguably point to a territorialist contraction in 
U.S. case law. 
 
 125. Gopalan et al., supra note 2, at 1259. 
 126. Metreveli, supra note 9, at 340. 
 127. See Bender et al., supra note 115, at 35; see also Walters, supra note 20, at 90 (“Vitro 
do[es] not significantly deviate from the prevailing American view that comity is the 
animating norm . . . .”). 
 128. Jaffé v. Samsung Elecs., 737 F.3d 14 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 129. Metreveli, supra note 9, at 338. 
 130. See Metreveli, supra note 9, at 338-39; Gopalan et al., supra note 2, at 1256. 
 131. See Walters, supra note 20, at 90. 
 132. In re Arcapita Bank B.S.C., 575 B.R. 229 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017). 
 133. In re SunEdison, Inc., 577 B.R. 120 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017). 
 134. Ostrow, supra note 95; accord Richard J. Mason & Karyn D. Heavenrich, More 
Mixed Signals on the Extraterritorial Reach of US Avoiding Powers, 12 INSOLVENCY & 
RESTRUCTURING INT’L 10, 12 (2018). 
 135. Ostrow, supra note 95. 
 136. Comity and Choice of Law, supra note 2, at 261; see also Williams et al., supra note 
23, at 25 (“However, a recent case . . . seemed to turn against the tide of U.S. thinking . . . .”). 
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The most recent literature points to a third era beginning.  In re Avanti 
Communications Group PLC (Avanti)137 has been touted as a good example 
that universalism is making a U.S. comeback.138  There, a U.S. court 
recognized a U.K. third-party release, and stated “that schemes of 
arrangements sanctioned under UK [sic] law that provide third-party non-
debtor guarantor releases should be recognized and enforced . . . “ provided 
the underlying voting was fair.139  The case was distinguished from Vitro “on 
the basis that the debtor’s scheme had ‘near unanimous support . . . .’”140  In 
2018, the Southern District of New York further embraced universalism in 
In re B.C.I. Finances Pty [sic] Limited141 and In re Agrokor D.D., et. al.142  
“More than 14 years on, chapter 15 [sic] remains relatively 
underutilized[,]”143 but “U.S. courts have been successful in establishing a 
pragmatic and effective modified universalist bankruptcy regime.”144 
 
B.  United Kingdom 
 
The U.K. has a very different insolvency history than the U.S. For 
example, imprisonment for consumer debts was only abolished in the U.K. 
in 1970.145  Further, there is some contention about the exact number of 
insolvency regimes in the U.K.146  In the U.K. “[e]arly cases after the 
adoption of the Model Law . . . applied the CBIR [the U.K. adoption of the 
Model Law] according to modified universalist principles.”147  First, in 
Cambridge Gas Transport Corporation v. Official Committee of Unsecured 
 
 137. In re Avanti Commc’ns. Grp. PLC, 582 B.R. 603, 618 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
 138. See, e.g., Bender et al., supra note 115, at 34 (observing that “hand-wringing” with 
regard to non-debtor releases would become unnecessary after the Arcapita decision). 
 139. In re Avanti Commc’ns. Grp. PLC, 582 B.R. at 618. 
 140. Crocco, supra note 21 (quoting In re Avanti Commc’ns. Grp. PLC, 582 B.R. at 618).  
 141. In re B.C.I. Fins. Pty [sic] Ltd., 583 B.R. 288, 297 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018) (holding 
that Australian substantive law would govern the New York case). 
 142. In re Agrokor d.d., et al., 591 B.R. 163, 169 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018) (honoring third-
party debtor releases issued in Croatian foreign main proceeding). 
 143. Tomasco et al., supra note 102, at 26; see also Crocco, supra note 21 (“[D]ata 
suggests that there has not been constant or meaningful growth in the rate of Chapter 15 filings 
in the United States.”). 
 144. Crocco, supra note 21.  
 145. See Ramsay, supra note 88, at 966. 
 146. See, e.g., Walters, supra note 20, at 79-80 (“Indeed, U.K. cross-border insolvency 
law is better thought of as being like a building with four rooms . . . .”); Gopalan et al.,  
supra note 2, at 1259 (“The United Kingdom has six potential legal regimes that operate in 
cross-border insolvency situations.”); McCormack et al., supra note 22, at 291 (“[T]here are 
three statutory vehicles for international/cross-border cooperation in [U.K.] insolvency 
matters . . . .”). 
 147. Metreveli, supra note 9, at 327-28. 
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Creditors of Navigator Holdings, PLC (Cambridge Gas),148 the court held 
that it could honor an Isle of Man bankruptcy plan “under its common law 
powers of assistance . . .”149 and that “fairness requires insolvency 
proceedings to have universal application.”150  In In re HIH Casualty & 
General Insurance Limited (In re HIH),151 it was determined upon appeal 
that the common law should be included as an option in U.K. cross-border 
insolvency.152  It was noted that “[c]reditors’ expectations formed part of the 
justification for the court’s holding . . . .”153 
This universalist era did not last long. The oft-cited first case of the 
countertrend was Rubin v. Eurofinance SA (Rubin),154 wherein the U.K court 
system “took a severe local turn, explicitly disavowing Cambridge Gas” and 
not honoring a U.S. judgment.155  Rubin has been described as “a turf war 
about the scope of U.K. cross-border insolvency law as a whole.”156  The 
Rubin court ultimately refused to honor a third-party judgment because third-
parties’ rights are not enumerated in the Model Law nor CBIR157  and doing 
so was found to be something that ought be left to the legislature.158  The 
court “merely bristled at the idea” of choosing the U.S. approach to similar 
situations.159 
In the years since Rubin there have been a few small victories for 
universalism,160 however cases such as Fibria Celulose S/A v. Pan Ocean Co 
Ltd (Pan Ocean)161 and Bakhshiyeva ex rel. International Bank of Azerbaijan 
 
 148. Cambridge Gas Transp. Corp. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (of 
Navigator Holdings PLC and others) [2006] UKPC 26, [2007] 1 AC 508 (PC) (appeal taken 
from Isle of Man). 
 149. Walters, supra note 20, at 100. 
 150. Metreveli, supra note 9, at 329. 
 151. McGrath v. Riddell (In re HIH Cas. & Gen. Ins. Ltd.) [2008] UKHL 21 (appeal taken 
from UK). 
 152. See Gopalan et al., supra note 2, at 1263. 
 153. Metreveli, supra note 9, at 330. 
 154. Rubin v. Eurofinance SA [2012] UKSC 46, [2013] 1 AC 236 (appeal taken from 
Eng.). 
 155. Interpretation Internationale, supra note 1, at 746; see also Metreveli, supra note 9, 
at 331 (“[Rubin] diverg[ed] from previous decisions”).  But cf. Walters, supra note 20, at 102 
(“Any suggestion that Rubin is an abandonment of modified universalism is overblown.”). 
 156. Walters, supra note 20, at 96. 
 157. See Sachdev, supra note 18, at 359 (quoting Rubin, [2012] UKSC 46 at [142]). 
 158. See Metreveli, supra note 9, at 331-32. 
 159. Pottow, supra note 17, at 485. 
 160. See, e.g., McCormack et al., supra note 22, at 289 (“[T]he court may [currently] 
recognize, under the UK [sic] version of the Model Law, Croatian insolvency proceedings . . . .”). 
 161. Fibria Celulose S/A v. Pan Ocean Co. Ltd. [2014] EWHC (Ch) 2124, [2014] Bus LR 
1041 (UK). 
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v. Sberbank of Russia (I.B.A.)162 have proven that territorialism has taken 
stronger hold in the U.K. than in here stateside.  In Pan Ocean, the U.K. 
court solidified that U.K. courts could not grant relief which was not 
available to domestic English debtors.163  In I.B.A., this attitude was again 
upheld,164 but the case is currently in the process of appeal.165  This leaves 
U.K. insolvency law drifting towards territorialism, as does the recent 
conservative political victory in the country.166 
 
C.  Australia 
 
Australia is the other large Model Law jurisdiction with moderate 
coverage in American legal literature.  Australia adopted the Model Law in 
2008,167 and the two main cases that have been cited in regards cross-border 
insolvency are Ackers v Saad Investment Company Limited (Ackers),168 and 
Yu v. STX Pan Ocean Company (Yu).169  In Ackers, an Australian tax court 
decided to keep the amount of tax debt it would have received if counted in 
a Cayman Island proceeding (that would not have counted it, nor given it 
anything back).170  In Yu, the Australian court allowed a maritime lienholder 
to move forward on vessels that were part of a foreign insolvency 
proceeding.171  Australia’s choice to do so has been criticized as being “for 
the benefit of local creditors . . .”172 and reflecting “the reluctance of 
 
 162. Bakhshiyeva ex rel. Int’l Bank of Azerbaijan v. Sberbank of Russia [2018] EWHC 
(Ch) 59, aff’d, [2018] EWCA Civ 2802 (UK). 
 163. See Walters, supra note 20, at 99. 
 164. See Comity and Choice of Law, supra note 2, at 270. 
 165. Sachdev, supra note 18, at 375. 
 166. See generally, Guy Faulconbridge & William James, Britain speeds towards Brexit 
as Johnson wins large majority in election, REUTERS WORLD NEWS, (Dec. 12, 2019, 2:05 
PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-election/britain-speeds-towards-brexit-as-
johnson-wins-large-majority-in-election-idUSKBN1YG2O5. 
 167. Michael Murray & Rosalind Mason, Model Law on Cross-border Insolvency - 
Exclusion of Australian Banks, 20 AUSTL. INSOLVENCY J., no. 4, 2008, at 4, https://www.insol. 
org/emailer/jan2009_downloads/Australia-UNCITRAL_Model%20Law.pdf (last viewed 
Dec. 15, 2019). 
 168. Ackers v Saad Invs Co Ltd (2010) 190 FCR 285 (Austl.). 
 169. Yu v STX Pan Ocean Co (2013) 223 FCR 189 (Austl.). 
 170. See Metreveli, supra note 9, at 333-34; see also Gopalan et al., supra note 2, at 1243 
(“Australia [kept] up to the pari passu amount . . . [they] would be entitled to receive as a 
dividend were [they] entitled to be admitted . . .” (quoting Akers v Saad Inves Co Ltd, [2013] 
FCA 738 [53] (Austl.))). 
 171. Martin Davies, Cross-Border Insolvency and Admiralty: A Middle Path of 
Reciprocal Comity, 66 AM. J. COMP. L. 101, 112 (2018). 
 172. Metreveli, supra note 9, at 335. 
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Australian courts to apply modified universalist principles . . . .”173  
Territorialism would seem to be winning “Down Under.” 
 
V.  Universalist Success in Other Jurisdictions 
 
Despite the successes of territorialism (or failures of universalism), 
especially in the U.K. and Australia, the world has many other jurisdictions 
that are opening their borders to more expansive creditors’ rights regimes 
and options.  Some are even taking their first ever international insolvency 
steps.  It cannot be overstated how drastic a change this can entail for a state. 
 
A.  Singapore 
 
Singapore adopted the JIN Guidelines in 2017.174  It also adopted the 
Model Law the same year,175 and it has stated officially that one of the 
reasons for adoption was to “influence foreign investment in Singapore 
favorably.”176  The previous year, Singapore courts made pro-universalist 
decisions in both Re Opti-Medix Ltd (Opti-Medix)177and Re Gulf Pacific 
Shipping Ltd (Gulf Pacific).178  In Opti-Medix, the Singaporean court 
“focused on COMI-type factors for choosing a central court rather than the 
old incorporation doctrine.”179  This aligns them with the arguably more-
refined EIR mode of cross-border insolvency.  In Gulf Pacific, Singapore 
“recognize[d] the appointment of liquidators over [the] Hong Kong shipping 
company . . . despite being in out-of-court proceedings regarding which the 
domestic powers of assistance were constrained.”180  Singapore appears to 




 173. Id. 
 174. Press Release, Supreme Court of Singapore, Paving the Way for Improved 
Coordination of Cross-Border Insolvency Proceedings: Adoption of the Guidelines for 
Communication and Cooperation between Courts in Cross-Border Insolvency Matters (Feb. 
1, 2017) (on file with author). 
 175. Press Release, United Nations Information Services (UNIS) Vienna, Singapore 
enacts legislation implementing UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (Mar. 
16, 2017) (on file with author). 
 176. McCormack et al., supra note 22, at 282 (quoting INSOLVENCY LAW REVIEW 
COMMITTEE, MINISTRY OF LAW, LAW REVIEW COMMITTEE: FINAL REPORT (Sing. 2013), 
https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/files/news/announcements/2013/10/ReportoftheInsolvencyLawRe
viewCommittee.pdf). 
 177. Re Opti-Medix Ltd. [2016] SGHC 108 (Sing.). 
 178. Re Gulf Pac. Shipping Ltd. [2016] SGHC 287 (Sing.). 
 179. Global Insolvency Proceedings, supra note 6, at 1482-83 (footnote omitted). 
 180. Mevorach, supra note 42, at 1433 (footnote omitted). 
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B.  India 
 
In May of 2016, India passed “an overhaul of the insolvency and 
bankruptcy scheme.”181  The new rules shift the process “away from a 
debtor-in-possession model, to a model where creditors decide on the 
resolution while an impartial professional” is put in charge.182  The new law 
will also hopefully allow unsecured creditors better legal avenues.183  While 
“[t]he Supreme Court . . . has hailed the Code to be a ‘creditor-friendly’ 
law[,]”184 there have been complaints that the new laws are too creditor-
friendly.185  Also, “the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, on June 20, 2018[,] 
issued a public notice . . . inviting comments and suggestions on the draft 
chapter on cross border [sic] insolvency it plans to introduce . . . based on 
the [UNCITRAL] Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency.”186  However, it 
has been otherwise argued that India has “remained resistant” to the Model 
Law,187 ergo, universalism.  
 
C.  Other Jurisdictions  
 
In 2013, Iran approved a trade bill that refers “explicitly and extensively 
to international bankruptcy.”188  The bill purportedly addresses creditor 
accessibility, “recognition of foreign proceedings, . . . judicial cooperation, 
and simultaneous proceedings.”189  However, the proceedings are still 
conducted exclusively using local applicable law190 or treaties,191 and 
bankruptcy is punishable by up to six years in prison.192  This is still good 
incremental progress. 
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In 2016, the Bahamas published new legislation “allow[ing] court-
appointed representatives to be recognized” by a list of 142 countries.193  The 
Bahamas still will not honor orders regarding secured creditors, and also 
retains the right to utilize a public policy exception.194  Here, the unsecured 
creditors will benefit more from the added universalism traits. 
Mexico decided to address issues such as the voting abuse in Vitro, 
discussed above, by a reformation of its “Ley de Concursos Mercantiles 
[bankruptcy laws] in 2014 in an attempt to further modernize its bankruptcy 
proceedings.”195  Mexico’s previous cross-border insolvency regime has 
been referred to as “an almost medieval system that strongly favoured [sic] 
the family owners of companies.”196  The two main issues that have been 
noted in the new system are that creditors can opt out of reorganization plans 
with which they disagree,197 and reorganizations are made more difficult by 
the automatic switch to a liquidation proceeding after one year.198  The new 
system is still progress and an acknowledgement that change was (and likely 
still is) needed. 
The United Arab Emirates promulgated a new bankruptcy law in 2016 
which, among other things, repeals the criminal laws regarding 
bankruptcy.199  One article states that the country enacted the law in hopes it 
will have a “positive impact on the UAE as a conducive financial market for 
international investors.”200  Under the new regime managers trade risk of 
imprisonment for joint liability, which the article’s author states is hoped to 
discourage the previous method of liability avoidance; to “opt for 
absconding from UAE.”201  International soft law instruments like the Model 
Law have likely influenced universalist shifts, such as this new regime. 
A recent article states that Saudi Arabia has remodeled “its economic 
endeavors to achieve an investment friendly [sic] atmosphere.”202  The 
system now allows for creditor-initiated restructuring and involves the 
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appointment of a trustee.203  One drawback of the system is that it still allows 
for “imprisonment not more than 5 (five) years and fine not more than SAR 
5 million.”204  The inclusion of creditors into the affairs of the debtor is 
arguably a huge step. 
 
VI.  Territorialist Successes in Other Jurisdictions 
 
Despite the positive international strides in the above jurisdictions, 
there are many other states that have not changed much lately from their 
fairly territorialist outlooks.  For example, in Russia, “[i]t is common for 
some trustees acting in the interests of the debtors to deliberately try to 
decrease the price of the assets in order to sell them to an affiliated or a 
controlling person of the debtor” and so independent experts are arguably 
necessary.205  Further, “a single corporate bankruptcy may take up several 
years, make thousands of people redundant and trigger losses worth 
millions.”206  Also, between 2014 and 2016, Russia added “shareholders, 
chair of the board, members of the board of directors, chief accountants and 
beneficiary owners” as control persons that are potentially personally liable 
for corporate debt.207 
“In 2006, China introduced its new Enterprise Bankruptcy Law.”208  
The law “expands eligibility for bankruptcy to all corporate debtors[] and 
recognizes the cross-border effect of some bankruptcy cases.”209  
Commentary has stated that the law is “not as comprehensive” regarding 
recognition of inbound cases.210  “To date, recognition decisions by Chinese 
courts are made mainly on the basis of bilateral judicial assistance 
treaties[,]”211 partially because “[t]here is little guidance as to what 
constitutes satisfaction of the reciprocity [alternative option] . . . .”212  While 
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there have not been a lot of Chinese cross-border insolvency cases,213 it is 
important to note that it “was the first law to make express provision for 
cross-border insolvency” in China.214  That stated, at least one author feels 
that “for the moment at least, creating a cross-border insolvency framework 
may not be a high priority in the area of insolvency law in China.”215  
Therefore, China is arguably exhibiting territorialist aspects through its lack 
of forward motion. 
Yet more surveyed countries lacked similar universalist motion.  For 
example, South Africa adopted the Model Law without enumerating any 
countries with which to have reciprocity, effectively making it “a dead letter 
. . . .”216  Japan adopted the Model Law and has subsequently become one of 
the only countries that grants pre-recognition stays of collections;217 but, 
Japan is plagued with issues regarding creditors not complying with 
reorganizations,218 debtors not being able to stay in-charge,219 and “the 
business restructuring proceedings . . . [being] structurally designed to 
require creditors . . . to push uphill.”220  In South America, “[s]hareholders 
continue to maintain control of the process in most jurisdictions . . .”221 and 
“restructurings throughout the region continue to be set against a backdrop 
of government involvement . . . .”222 
 
VII.  Conclusion 
 
While this Comment cannot address every differing insolvency system 
in the world, it is apparent that there are many different states in very 
different parts of the globe that are making positive and steady strides 
towards modified universalism.  The recent setbacks in the U.S. are already 
on the mend through decisions such as the recent Arcapita case.  Both 
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Australia and the U.K., however, have exhibited a recent territorialist 
tendency in their insolvency regimes that does not seem to be yet reversing.  
Positive strides in large jurisdictions such as Singapore and India, as 
well as wealthy ones such as Iran, bespeak a very strong undercurrent of 
modified universalist ideology slowly making its way around the globe.  
While never completely identical to another states’ version, soft law such as 
the Model Law has definitely made an impact worldwide. 
In the coming years, the effects of the newly released Model 
Enforcement Law and JIN Guidelines will also likely begin to be observed 
in modern legal literature.  Similarly, the author predicts that these fellow 
soft law tools will sublimate their suggestions into more hard law 
instruments and agreements.  For the foregoing reasons, it is readily apparent 
that modified universalism is thriving as the 2010’s become the 2020’s.  
This, itself, proves the world moves ever closer to a universalist global 
insolvency outlook.  The future likely holds many new cooperative and 
innovative restructuring endeavors as the rules of the game continue to 
solidify and become more ubiquitous. 
 
